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6687b, section 22, of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes"' may provide
a precise formula for establishing such incompetence. That provision
contains the statutory definition of "habitual" violator for purposes
of establishing criteria for revoking one's driver's license. A certain
number of violations or convictions within a certain time period for
a type or class of negligence or incompetence could be formulated to
establish incompetence of the driver in negligent entrustment cases.
Such a rule would make proof of general incompetence considerably
easier and could be used to establish reputation for incompetence.
Such a rule would contribute clarity to the burden of proving negli-
gent entrustment in Texas and if strictly construed and confined to
the competency issue (as distinguished from negligence at the time
of the accident) would reduce jury prejudice to some degree.
Sam P. Burford, Jr.
The Unit-of-Time Argument - Inherently Prejudicial?
I. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING
Prior to World War II very little attention was given to the
subject of damages for personal injuries.' Since that time drastic
increases in recoveries in personal injury litigation have resulted in
mounting concern over the methods used to determine the damages
awarded an injured party.! Generally a party is entitled to be com-
pensated for his economic loss and for the pain and suffering he has
incurred-the theory being that such an award will serve to make
him as "whole" a person as he was before the injury.' Because eco-
nomic loss (i.e., past and future medical expenses, past wages lost,
and loss of future earning capacity) can be determined with rea-
sonable certainty, few problems have arisen as to its method of cal-
34 Section 22(b) of the statute states:
The authority to suspend the license of any operator . . . is granted to the
Department . . . [of Public Safety] upon determining after proper hearing
• .. that the licensee:
3. Is a habitual reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle.
4. Is a habitual violator of the traffic law. The term "habitual violator" as
used herein shall mean any person with four (4) or more convictions arising
out of different transactions in a consecutive period of twelve (12) months,
or seven (7) or more convictions . . .within a period of twenty-four (24)
months, such convictions being for moving violations of traffic laws of the
State of Texas .. "
Wright, Damages for Personal Injuries-Foreword, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 155 (1958).
2Id. at 156.
'Eastern Iron & Metal Co. v. McMorrouh, 135 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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culation.' The amount of damages to be awarded a plaintiff for his
pain and suffering is a different matter. Juries traditionally have been
instructed to award an amount which they consider will fairly and
reasonably compensate the plantiff s and to consider such factors as
the nature, intensity, and extent of the pain and suffering as dis-
closed by the evidence Thus the trier of fact, guided only by evi-
dence of a subjective nature, must determine in its sound discretion
what amount of money would reasonably compensate a plaintiff for
the pain and suffering he has sustained. Because the jury is placed
in the difficult position of measuring damages which are unavoidably
vague, courts in recent years have been presented with the problem
of deciding whether counsel should be allowed to argue to the jury
contentions supplemental to the traditional "reasonable compensa-
tion" instruction.
II. USE OF THE MATHEMATICAL FORMULA OR UNIT OF TIME
ARGUMENT
Theorizing that it is necessary for the jury to be guided by some
reasonable and practical considerations rather than blindly guessing
what a reasonable allowance for pain and suffering would be, some
jurisdictions' have allowed plaintiff's counsel to use a mathematical
formula in arguing for such damages. The mathematical formula is
based upon the suggestion of a specific sum of money per day or
other unit of time during which pain has been or will be suffered,
e.g., five dollars per day for past and future suffering, or one dollar
4 Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 211 (1958).
'Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274
(1960).
'Id. at 277, 11 Wis. 2d 604.
7See e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Yates v. Wenk,
363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Botta v. Bruner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713
(1958); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Hoyle v.
Van Horn, 236 Or. 205, 387 P.2d 985 (1963); Harper v. Bolton, 124 S.E.2d 54 (S.C.
1962); Simmons Motor Co. v. Mosley, 379 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref.
n.r.e.; Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960).
'Alabama: McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Arkansas: Vand-
landingham v. Gartman, 236 Ark. 504, 367 S.W.2d 111 (1963); California: Seffert v. Los
Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337 (1961); Colorado:
Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811 (1963); District of Columbia: Evening
Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962); Florida: Ratner v.
Arrington, IIl So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Indiana: Evansville City Coach Lines,
Inc. v. Atherton; 133 Ind. App. 304, 179 N.E.2d 293 (1962); Iowa: Corkery v. Greenberg,
253 Iowa 846, 114 N.W.2d 327 (1962); Kentucky: Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mattingly,
339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. App. 1960); Louisiana: Little v. Hughes, 136 So. 2d 448 (La. App.
1961); Maryland: Lebow v. Reichel, 231 Md. 421, 190 A.2d 642 (1963); Michigan: Yates
v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Mississippi: Four-County Elec. Power
Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Nevada: Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev.
437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Oregon: Hoyle v. Van Horn, 236 Or. 205, 387 P.2d 985 (1963);
Utah: Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960);
Washington: Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960).
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per waking hour for past and future suffering. This unit-of-time
argument is allowed because these courts consider it a segment of
counsel's authority to draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions
from the evidence.
At the opposite end of the judicial spectrum are those jurisdictions"
which take the position that an award for pain and suffering based on
a mathematical fomula ignores the fundamentally subjective basis of
such damages. The prevailing rationale of these cases is that since no
monetary value can objectively be placed on pain and suffering (as
distinguished from economic loss) any suggestion of a specific mone-
tary value, either per unit or lump sum, is not derived from the evi-
dence and tends only to lead the jury into making excessive awards.
Because pain varies with the individual, these jurisdictions feel that
any dollars and cents estimate per unit of time cannot be accurate.
A middle ground is held by those jurisdictions"0 which have dis-
approved the unit-of-time argument, yet expressly allow plaintiff's
counsel to mention to the jury the lump-sum figure being sought for
damages resulting from plaintiff's pain and suffering. It has been
contended" that this view is inconsistent because it is not remedial
of the objection to placing a specific monetary value, which cannot
be derived from the evidence, on pain and suffering.
Still another position is held by jurisdictions" which rather than
allowing the unit-of-time argument unconditionally, allow it for
illustrative purposes only. In these states counsel may relate to the
jury the mathematical calculations used to arrive at the sum asked
for, but the jury is not allowed to use such calculations in reaching
their award. This "look, but don't touch" position also has been
criticized as being inconsistent in admitting that a jury is sophistica--
'Delaware: Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Hawaii: Franco v.
Fujimoto, 47 Haw. 1, 390 P.2d 740 (1964); Illinois: Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390,
182 N.E.2d 206 (1962); Kansas: Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 190
Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962); New Jersey: Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713
(1958); New York: Paley v. Brust, 250 N.Y. Supp. 2d 356 (Ist Dept. App. Div. 1964);
Ohio: Boop v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 118 Ohio App. 171, 193 N.E.2d 714 (1963); Pennsylvania:
Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Rys., 255 Pa. 387, 100 A. 123 (1917); South Carolina: Harper v.
Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54 (1962); Virginia: Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v.
Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); West Virginia: Crum v. Ward, 146
W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961); Wisconsin: Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp.
Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
50Massachusetts: Kinnear v. General Mills, Inc., 308 Mass. 344, 32 N.E.2d 263 (1941);
Missouri: Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960); New Hampshire: Sanders
v. Boston & Me. R.R., 77 N.H. 381, 92 A. 546 (1914); Wisconsin: Affett v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
"Comment, Damages-Pain and Suffering-Use of a Mathematical Formula, 60 MICH.
L. REv. 612 (1962).
"
5 Minnesota: Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30
(1956); North Dakota: King v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D.
1961).
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ted enough to hear the argument without being unduly influenced,
while refusing to recognize that a jury is sophisticated enough to use
a mathematical formula to reach a reasonable and just award. 3
Texas is a jurisdiction difficult to categorize. In 1932 the Texas
Commission of Appeals held in Renner v. West Texas Utilities4 that it
was improper for plaintiff's attorney to argue that if the jury awarded
three dollars per day for twenty years to one who had lost the use
of a leg as that plaintiff had, the amount so paid would be $25,000.
The opinion was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court." A later
Texas court of civil appeals case" held that it was improper for
plaintiff's attorney to display to the jury a blackboard which depicted,
among other things, the lump-sum figure requested, and to argue
therefrom damages for pain and suffering. However, in the more re-
cent Texas court of civil appeals cases, 7 where the issue of the
propriety of the unit of time argument in calculating damages for
pain and suffering was met squarely, the courts consistently have
held, without mentioning Renner, that the argument is proper with
or without the aid of blackboards, placards, or charts." The prevail-
ing rationale of these cases is that the attorney is entitled to discuss
freely or comment on such facts as are in evidence and draw from
the facts and circumstances any inferences and deductions that are
reasonable, fair, and drawn in good faith. Since there must be some
evidence in the record that pain was actually suffered, and since pain
is suffered month-by-month and year-by-year, it is a fair argument
to treat pain the way it was endured." However because the inter-
mediate appellate courts neither have distinguished nor considered
Renner controlling, and, because the Supreme Court has consistently
n.r.e.'d." cases involving the question," Texas' position remains un-
certain.
13 See note 11 supra.
14 West Texas Util. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
"Id. at 457.
16Warren Petroleum Co. v. Pyeatt, 275 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
n.r.e.
'" Simmons Motor Co. v. Mosley, 379 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.;
Mid Tex Dev. Co. v. McJunkin, 369 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Hernandez v.
Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Chemical Express v. Cole,
342 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Flowers,
336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325
S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Cruz,
280 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line
v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
"See Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Cruz, 280 S.W.2d 388 (Tex .Civ. App. 1955)
error ref. n.r.e., and cases cited therein.
"Hernandez v. Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
"See cases cited in note 17 supra. It is possible that the writ history of these cases indi-
cates a sub-silentio repudiation of the language of West Texas Util. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d
451 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
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The position of the federal courts is equally unclear. Prior to 1965
only two United States courts of appeals had been confronted with
the question of the propriety of the unit-of-time argument. In 1960
the Third Circuit held"' that it no longer would follow an earlier
decision2 which prohibited the jury, in personal injury suits, from
hearing any fixed sum claim for damages for pain and suffering. In
so doing the court affirmed the district court's opinion" that no
error was committed by plaintiff's attorney in suggesting that plain-
tiff's hourly wage rate ($2.77) would be a reasonable award per
hour for future pain and suffering where the result was not only
fair, but was also clearly supported by the evidence. In 1961 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard Pennsylvania Railroad
v McKinley. " There the court had the issue of the propriety of the
unit-of-time argument directly before it, but rather than deciding
conclusively for or against use of the argument, the court chose to
leave the question of its propriety to the discretion of the trial judges.
In refusing to reverse and remand the judgment because of the plain-
tiff's attorney's use of the unit-of-time argument, the court stated:
Control of the conduct of counsel so as to keep it within the limits of
legitimate advocacy is primarily the duty and responsibility of the trial
judge. We will not find error in his discharge of such duty unless we
are persuaded that what he did, or failed to do, in matters within his
discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the
parties litigant of a fair trial."
An early Eighth Circuit case, 6 in which the issue actually before
the court was whether or not the amount awarded for damages should
be discounted to present value, has been considered authority for
the proposition that the unit-of-time argument is improper. The
court held that because damages for future economic loss can be
mathematically computed with reasonable accuracy, an award for
such damages should be discounted to present value; however, dam-
ages for pain and suffering should not be discounted to present value
because any attempt to set a specific value per unit of time for an
individual's pain, suffering, or inconvenience would be an absurdity.
The court felt that the more just and reasonable award for pain and
"Bowers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960), aflrming 182 F. Supp.
756 (D. Del. 1960).
2Vaughn v. Magee, 218 F. 630 (3d Cir. 1914).
"See note 21 supra.
24288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961).
" Id. at 267. As authority for the proposition that use of the argument does not per
se result in error, the court cited Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), in
which it affirmed use of a unit-of-time formula by a United States district judge, sitting
without a jury in an admiralty case.
2" Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Chandler, 283 F. 881 (8th Cir. 1922).
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suffering would be reached by a jury considering the injured party's
life as a whole. In light of this background, the Fifth Circuit was
called upon to decide whether the use of the unit-of-time argument
was proper. The question was squarely presented, and both parties
directed their argument to the issue.
III. JOHNSON V. COLGLAZIER7
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought a civil diversity action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of a collision be-
tween their automobile and a trailer, which had become detached
from a truck owned by the defendant. 8 Prior to closing arguments,
the defendant objected to plaintiff's proposed use of the unit-of-time
argument, supported by use of placards for illustration. The objec-
tion was overruled. Plaintiffs' attorney stated to the jury that he had,
"prepared a chart for the purpose of outlining my argument . . .
[and that] these charts merely reflect my contentions. ... "" After
emphasizing that the charts were not in evidence, plaintiffs' attorney
proceeded to argue, with reference to the charts, as to the measure
of damages for the physical pain and mental anguish suffered by the
plaintiffs. The attorney argued for sums ranging from five dollars
to five cents per waking hour per day, the amounts varying in rela-
lation to various time periods such as days spent in the hospital, days
from the accident to the trial, and days of future pain and suffer-
ing.' While defendant objected to this argument, no requests for
27348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).
28 See Brief for Appellants, p. 2, Johnson v. Colglazier, note 27 supra.
2
9Id. at 15-16.
'OA part of one of the placards which plaintiffs' attorney displayed to the jury and
argued the measure of damages from read as follows:
Physical Pain:
1st 15 days in hospital @ $5 per waking
hour x 16 hrs. per day = $ 1,200.00
Next two months @ $2 per waking hour
x 16 hrs. x 60 days = 1,920.00
January 1962 to date of trial @ 254 per waking hr. 3,500.00
Balance of life expectancy @ 254 per waking hour:
254 x 16 hrs. x 365 x 8 yrs. 11,430.00
$18,050.00
Mental Anguish:
1st 15 days in hospital @ $2 per waking
hr. x 16 hrs. per day = $ 480.00
Next two months @ $1 per waking hour
x 16 hrs. x 60 days 960.00
Jan. 1962 to date of trial @ 100 per
waking hr.: 100 x 16 x 505 days - 808.00
Balance of life expectancy @ 54 per waking
hr.: 54 x 16 hrs. per day x 365 days per
yr. x 8 yrs. = 2,336.00
$4,584.00
Brief for Appellants, pp. 12-13.
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special instructions were made respecting it. The jury returned a
verdict for the husband in the amount of $24,486.25 and for the wife
in the amount of $46,220.47.3' The defendant appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contending that the
verdicts were excessive, and that the court erred in the following re-
spects: in allowing plaintiffs' attorney to use the unit-of-time basis
in arguing for damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish; and
in allowing him to exhibit large charts showing the computation of
damages on this basis."
The Fifth Circuit was unanimous in determining that the ques-
tions of the propriety of argument by counsel and of the propriety
of the conduct of the trial court in relation to the argument were
procedural matters to be governed by federal law. A majority of
the court, however, reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial.
It felt that the trial court had permitted the argument of plaintiffs'
counsel to transgress the bounds of legitimate advocacy because the
argument had the effect of a "golden rule" appeal, i.e., a plea to the
jury to put themselves in the plaintiffs' place, and because it resulted
in the jury's returning a larger verdict than could have been expected
without the use of the argument."
Maryland Casualty v. Reid" was relied upon for the holding that
the trial court's failure to take corrective measures in relation to the
closing argument of plaintiffs' attorney was reversible error. The
Johnson court inserted into its opinion a lengthy quotation from
Maryland Casualty, which concluded with the following language:
"This court, as to law cases, is a court of error. We do not retry the
case. We review the record made in it for reversible error, error by the
judge, in conducting or failing to conduct the trial, which has, by
"1 For the total amount requested for Mrs. Colglazier's injuries, see note 52 infra.
a2 Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1965).
33348 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1965). The court reasoned that under the rule of Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, as applied in Monarch Ins. Co. of
Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960), federal law controlled as to the propriety of
counsel's argument and the judge's conduct in relation thereto, because the need of the
federal courts, as an independent system, to provide uniformity of practice outweighed any
possible difference in outcome which could result from choice of forum. Cf., Yeargin v. Na-
tional Dairy Products Corp., 317 F.2d 779, 780 (8th Cir. 1963); Illinois Central R.R. Co.
v. Staples, 272 F.2d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 1959); Garret v. Faust, 183 F.2d 721, 726 (3d Cit.
1950); Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721, 726 (3d Cir. 1949). See generally
Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692 (1963).
Because the court held that federal law was controlling, the decision should not be con-
sidered speculation by the Fifth Circuit as to whether the Texas Supreme Court considers
its adoption of West Texas Util. Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 ((Tex. Com. App. 1932),
to be controlling in that jurisdiction.
34 34 8 F.2d 420, 425 (5th Cit. 1965).
376 F.2d 30 (5th Cit. 1935).
permitting the case to get out of bounds, prejudiced the just result., 3
In order to stay within the language of Maryland Casualty, i.e., to
determine that a just result had been prejudiced, the Johnson court
resorted to language which was inconsistent at best. It stated that
while the amount of the verdict was"not so excessive per se as to
require reversal,"37 since a part of the verdict was a product of an
improper argument the judgment "must be reversed because exces-
sive.""8 Apparently the court was of the opinion that any use of the
unit-of-time argument is inherently prejudicial and that consequent-
ly any verdict returned by a jury which had been confronted with
the argument is inherently excessive, regardless of whether this exces-
siveness is manifested in the result.
Only brief mention was made of the federal cases3 ' which speci-
fically pertained to the unit-of-time argument. The court chose to
rely upon Botta v. Brunner"5 as stating that the best reasons for
rejecting the unit-of-time argument. In that case, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that the unit-of-time argument was improper, as
was any mention of a lump-sum figure to the jury. The rationale of
this holding was as follows: the argument is not supported by the
evidence because pain, suffering, and mental anguish cannot be mea-
sured forensically in dollars on a unit-of-time basis; the argument
creates an illusion of certainty which does not and connot exist; and
the argument tends implicitly to encourage the "golden rule," or
"put yourself in the plaintiff's shoes," approach by the jury. These
considerations were held to outweigh the counter arguments that
counsel is entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from and state
his opinion of the evidence, and that it is preferable for the jury to
have some guideline rather than being left with the task of fixing
a damage figure by guesswork.
The Johnson court was not called upon to decide, and did not hold,
as the Botta court did, that mention of a lump-sum figure would be
reversible error. In his dissenting opinion" Judge Brown contended
that, aside from its possible greater effectiveness, the same objections
to use of the unit-of-time argument apply with equal force to the
36348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965). (Emphasis added.) Maryland Casualty went on to
state further: "We do not reverse cases for insubstantial error." Supra.
37 348 F.2d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 1965).
3' Ibid.
39 348 F.2d 420, 423-424 (5th Cir. 1965). In favor of the appellants, the court quoted
from Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1922). In favor of the
appellees, the court quoted from Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262, 267 (6th
Cir. 1961).
4026 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
4' 348 F.2d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 1965).
NOTES1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
permissible practice of arguing a lump-sum figure to the jury."' He
concluded that the majority's reason for holding the argument to be
improper must therefore be its effectiveness, i.e., its tendency to pro-
duce larger verdicts than would mention of the lump sum." Judge
Brown took the position that excessive verdicts can be curtailed with-
out denying the resourceful attorney an effective tool of advocacy.
He considered the majority's sweeping condemnation of the unit-of-
time argument an undue restriction on attorneys as well as an un-
warranted debasement of both the federal district judge's capacity
to keep the case in bounds and the jurors' capacity to employ their
common sense." As safeguards against excessive verdicts, while still
allowing the use of the unit-of-time argument, Judge Brown sug-
gested that the attorney should be required to forewarn his adversary
of his intent to use the argument; the court should carefully scrut-
inize any demonstrative devices which are to be used in connection
with the argument in order to avoid false factual impressions; and
the court should instruct the jurors that they are not hearing evidence
but merely counsel's contentions. In harmony with these safeguards,
more faith should be given to the good sense of jurors and to the
ability of the opposing attorney to counteract the argument."
Judge Brown further contended" that possibly the unit-of-time
argument possibly could be employed in harmony with the majority
opinion so long as a specific sum of money is not correlated with a
specific unit of time, and no demonstrative devices, e.g., placards,
charts, or blackboards, are used in conjunction with the argument.
Judge Brown felt that this could be accomplished by mentioning
the lump-sum figure sought and then impressing upon the jurors'
minds that pain is endured over a period of time during which years,
months, weeks, days, hours, and minutes pass by. The attorney could
then suggest that it would be reasonable for the jury to consider
these units of time in reaching the lump-sum figure to be awarded.
While such an approach would avoid the objection of placing a mon-
etary value on what is considered inherently immeasurable, there is
little reason to believe that the majority would close its eyes to the
"2Id. at 428.
4Ibid.
" 348 F.2d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 1965).
4' Id. at 429-430. One writer suggests that where the unit-of-time argument is allowed,
discounting the award of damages for pain and suffering to its present value would be a
necessary and effective safeguard. Comment, Damages-Pain and Suffering-Use of a Mathe-
matical Formula, 60 MICH. L. REV. 612 (1962). Such an approach, however, of necessity
would require the presumption that all juries, when allowed to hear the argument, will use
it in determining their award. This cannot be a certainty, particularly where defendant's
attorney does an effective job of rebuttal. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
348 F.2d 420, 426-428 (5th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 20
NOTES
fact that only the step of division by the jury of the units (a) of
time into the lump-sum figure distinguishes this approach from the
true unit-of-time argument. If the majority's real objection to the
unit-of-time argument was its greater effectiveness, as compared
to mention of the lump-sum figure, it is doubtful that such an argu-
ment would be permissible.
If fear of excessive verdicts was the sole reason for dissallowance of
the unit-of-time argument, the court should have been more con-
cerned with the amount of the judgment itself rather than how it
was obtained. In Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley,"7 the question of
the propriety of the unit-of-time argument was squarely decided;
and the Sixth Circuit refused to hold that use of the argument re-
sulted in prejudicial error. It was recognized that use of the argument
could be a factor in producing a judgment which was clearly exces-
sive, and the court stated that such a judgment would be reversed.
By ignoring the sound reasoning of the federal cases most directly
in point and by condemning the judgment as excessive, even though
the verdict was not so "excessive per se as to require reversal,'" the
Johnson court has made a sweeping condemnation of an argument
without clearly showing its prejudicial nature. Rejected was the
alternative of placing confidence in the jury and the adversary sys-
tem.
Certainly the most effective control over excessive verdicts can
and should be the opposing attorney. The unit-of-time argument is
not irrebutable, as many decisions seem to indicate." Some defense
attorneys have successfully used the "TV Argument.""0 The argument
proceeds in the following manner: The jurors are reminded that a
television set can be purchased for $200 and enjoyment from the
set can be derived by the family daily. The attorney then explains
that he is going to show the jury a trick based on a mathematical
calculation. He states that one can go to a movie which lasts ap-
proximately two hours by purchasing a ticket for $1.25, and for sim-
plicity's sake and fairness the movie will be valued at 500 per hour;
thus, if a movie is worth 500 per hour, then television entertainment
is worth 50¢ per hour. Stressing that he wishes the account to be
fair, the attorney argues that the television will be viewed by various
members of the family at least four hours per day for 300 days of
47288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961).
48348 F.2d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 1965).
49 See, e.g., Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 183 A.2d 713 (1958); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
50 See "The TV . . . Answer To . . . Blackboard Build Up of Damages," Alabama De-
fense Lawyers' Journal, April 1965, p. 59.
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each year. Thus a television set given a ten-year life expectancy
would be worth $6,000. If four members of the family derive enjoy-
ment from the television over this ten-year period, the television set
is worth $24,000 to the family as a whole. The purpose of the argu-
ment is to ridicule the method of calculation argued by plaintiff's
attorney; and, while not logically flawless, it is often effective. If the
attorney's suggestions are susceptible to ridicule, the jury is made
aware of this fact and the plaintiff will suffer as a result. If on the
other hand, plaintiff's argument is not susceptible to ridicule, i.e.,
his calculations are reasonable, this "TV Argument" may have an
adverse effect on the defendant's case.' If the defendant's attorney is
content to leave the argument unanswered, he should not be heard
to complain later that use of the argument was prejudicial merely
because it was effective.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the same verdict had been returned by a jury which had not
been exposed to the unit-of-time argument, it seems clear that the
Johnson court would have upheld it as a fair and just result. Since
the argument was allowed, however, the court took the position that
reversible error was created because the verdict was inherently exces-
sive in part, even though not excessive as a whole. The court also
equated use of the unit-of-time argument with the universally pro-
hibited "golden rule" appeal. As contended by Judge Brown in his
dissent, the unit-of-time argument, absent specific language request-
ing the jurors to put themselves in the plaintiff's place, presents no
more of an appeal to the "golden rule" than does mention to the
jury of a lump-sum figure. Because this and other objections to the
unit-of-time argument apply with equal force to the mention of a
lump-sum figure, it seems clear that the principal motivation for
the court's holding was the effectiveness of the unit-of-time argu-
ment.
Texas courts, as well as courts of other jurisdictions, when called
upon to decide the issue of the propriety of the unit-of-time argu-
ment might well consider the following statements from Judge
Brown's dissent:
That a forensic technique is effective is hardly grounds for prohibiting
it. The real hazard arises, of course, from the fact that the standard
for damages for pain and suffering is unavoidably vague. But so long
"s Ibid. The reporter of the argument, as a caveat, suggests that the argument cannot be
used in all cases, as it may be construed by the jury as an attempt to belittle the seriousness
of the plaintiff's injuries.
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as the law tolerates the jury measuring what Botta and all the other
anti cases regard as monetarily immeasurable, it is counsel's right-in-
deed duty-to employ all honorable appeals to persuasive action."2
Rather than making a sweeping condemnation of the use of the unit-
of-time argument, courts should place more faith in the good sense
of present day jurors and in the adversary system itself. Because the
award was substantially less than plaintiffs' attorney argued for,3
Johnson exemplifies the proposition that "juries are not so likely to
get excited or inflamed by lawyer's talk as lawyers think they are." 4
Robert B. Davis
52348 F.2d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 1965).
53 1d. at 430, n.13. For Mrs. Colglazier, damages in the amount of $180,536.67 were
sought. The jury returned a verdict of $46,220.46.
" Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721, 726 (3d Cir. 1949).
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